Not Just Babble: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment with Iterative Numerical Messages

Brown University Department of Economics Paper No. 2005-05

47 Pages Posted: 18 May 2005

See all articles by Louis Putterman

Louis Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics

Oliver Bochet

University of Namur

Date Written: July 27, 2004

Abstract

When subjects can make non-binding announcements of possible contributions to a public good numerically, there is no effect on average level of contributions in a public goods experiment relative to play without announcements. But a detailed analysis of this experiment shows that pre-play announcements increased the variance of achieved cooperation among groups, leading both to more highly cooperative groups and to more thoroughly uncooperative groups than in a treatment without announcements. We also add a treatment in which subjects can select a statement of (non-binding) "promise" to contribute a certain amount and we find that even though subjects were instructed that promise statements were not binding, the ability to issue them significantly increased both contributions and earnings in a treatment that includes costly punishment opportunities, although not in a treatment without punishment.

Keywords: Public goods, collective action, communication, punishment, cheap talk

JEL Classification: C91, H41, D23

Suggested Citation

Putterman, Louis G. and Bochet, Oliver, Not Just Babble: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment with Iterative Numerical Messages (July 27, 2004). Brown University Department of Economics Paper No. 2005-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=724244 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724244

Louis G. Putterman (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-3837 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Oliver Bochet

University of Namur ( email )

8 rempart de la vierge
Namur 5000
Belgium