Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms

UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 97-16

35 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 1998

See all articles by Makoto Shimoji

Makoto Shimoji

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies

Joel Watson

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 1997

Abstract

We propose a notion of conditional dominance for games whose representations designate information sets. We prove that iterated conditional dominance is equivalent to extensive form rationalizability. We also conduct a general analysis of these concepts, yielding new insights on rationalizability and on the equivalence of solutions when applied to different representations of a game.

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Shimoji, Makoto and Watson, Joel, Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms (July 1997). UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 97-16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=73448 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.73448

Makoto Shimoji

University of York - Department of Economics and Related Studies ( email )

Heslington
York, YO1 5DD
United Kingdom

Joel Watson (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics ( email )

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