Why Did the Clayton Act Pass?: An Analysis of the Interest Group Hypothesis

George Mason University WP No. 98.03

Posted: 23 Apr 1998

See all articles by Carlos D. Ramirez

Carlos D. Ramirez

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Christian Eigen-Zucchi

George Mason University

Date Written: 1998

Abstract

Conventional wisdom has it that the Clayton Act of 1914 was enacted as a replacement for the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890: as markets found a way of circumventing the antitrust Act, the story goes, monopolies and trusts began to develop again at the beginning of the century, making it necessary to revise the law. A second hypothesis asserts that since the Clayton Act redistributed welfare among different groups in the economy, interest groups influenced politicians' vote on the passage of the Act. In this paper, we investigate whether these assertions can be empirically confirmed by estimating a political voting model of the passing of the Clayton Act. We also use stock market data to investigate which interest group was affected the most by this legislation during its gestation period.

JEL Classification: H1

Suggested Citation

Ramirez, Carlos D. and Eigen-Zucchi, Christian, Why Did the Clayton Act Pass?: An Analysis of the Interest Group Hypothesis (1998). George Mason University WP No. 98.03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=75105

Carlos D. Ramirez (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Enterprise Hall MSN 3G4
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1130 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)

Christian Eigen-Zucchi

George Mason University

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,781
PlumX Metrics