Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust

31 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2005 Last revised: 27 Mar 2022

See all articles by Robert S. Pindyck

Robert S. Pindyck

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2005

Abstract

Sunk costs play a central role in antitrust economics, but are often misunderstood and mismeasured. I will try to clarify some of the conceptual and empirical issues related to sunk costs, and explain their implications for antitrust analysis. I will be particularly concerned with the role of uncertainty. When market conditions evolve unpredictably (as they almost always do), firms incur an opportunity cost when they invest in new capital, because they give up the option to wait for the arrival of new information about the likely returns from the investment. This option value is a sunk cost, and is just as relevant for antitrust analysis as the direct cost of a machine or a factory.

Suggested Citation

Pindyck, Robert S., Sunk Costs and Real Options in Antitrust (June 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11430, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=752008

Robert S. Pindyck (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
617-253-6641 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.mit.edu/rpindyck/www/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
75
Abstract Views
1,979
Rank
86,679
PlumX Metrics