Capital Controls, Exchange Rate Volatility and External Vulnerability

40 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2005 Last revised: 30 Sep 2022

See all articles by Sebastian Edwards

Sebastian Edwards

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Global Economics and Management (GEM) Area; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Roberto Rigobon

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Date Written: June 2005

Abstract

We use high frequency data and a new econometric methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows. We focus on Chile's experience during the 1990s and investigate whether controls on capital inflows reduced Chile's vulnerability to external shocks. We recognize that changes in the controls will affect the way in which different macro variables relate to each other. We take this problem seriously, and we develop a methodology to deal explicitly with it. The main findings may be summarized as follows: (a) A tightening of capital controls on inflows depreciates the exchange rate. (b) We find that the "vulnerability" of the nominal exchange rate to external factors decreases with a tightening of the capital controls. And (c), we find that a tightening of capital controls increases the unconditional volatility of the exchange rate, but makes this volatility less sensitive to external shocks.

Suggested Citation

Edwards, Sebastian and Rigobon, Roberto, Capital Controls, Exchange Rate Volatility and External Vulnerability (June 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11434, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=752012

Sebastian Edwards (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Global Economics and Management (GEM) Area ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Roberto Rigobon

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

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United States
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