Capital Requirements and Rational Discount Window Borrowing

Posted: 10 Sep 1996

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: Undated

Abstract

When banks face capital regulations and stochastic deposit supply, their decisions to borrow at the discount window will be affected by a broader range of variables than previous theoretical and empirical studies have recognized. Moreover, those decisions can respond discontinuously to changes in market parameters and to the form of rationing rule by which the discount window is administered. Risk aversion can complicate these linkages considerably, even causing some banks to prefer a positive discount rate that may exceed the actual level. This paper embodies the views of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System.

JEL Classification: G24

Suggested Citation

Shaffer, Sherrill, Capital Requirements and Rational Discount Window Borrowing (Undated). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7720

Sherrill Shaffer (Contact Author)

University of Wyoming ( email )

P.O. Box 3985
Laramie, WY 82071-3985
United States
307-766-2173 (Phone)
307-766-5090 (Fax)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
705
PlumX Metrics