Information in Mechanism Design

51 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2005

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics; University of Southampton - Division of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but related aspects of information management important in many design settings. We review the existing literature and point out directions for additional future work.

Note: An updated version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=876970

Keywords: Mechanism design, information acquisition, ex post equilibrium, robust mechanism design, interdependent values, information management

JEL Classification: C79, D82

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Valimaki, Juuso, Information in Mechanism Design (August 2005). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1532, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=788728

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

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New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Juuso Valimaki

Helsinki School of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 21210
Helsinki 00100, 00101
Finland

University of Southampton - Division of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom
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