Why are Some Public Officials More Corrupt than Others?

42 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2005 Last revised: 26 Dec 2022

See all articles by Jennifer Hunt

Jennifer Hunt

McGill University - Department of Economics; Rutgers University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials' clients explain most of the variation for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts. A measure of the speed of honest service at the institution explains much of the remaining variation for both bribery rates and amounts. The results indicate that the bribery rate is higher at institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that bribery rates and bribe amounts are higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions.

Suggested Citation

Hunt, Jennifer and Hunt, Jennifer, Why are Some Public Officials More Corrupt than Others? (September 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11595, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=800450

Jennifer Hunt (Contact Author)

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