Limiting Limited Liability

12 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2005

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

Limited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.

Keywords: insolvency, judgment proof, liability, bankruptcy, liability cap

JEL Classification: K13, K32, L59

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Limiting Limited Liability. Economics Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-7, 2006, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-32, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2005-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=814749

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Postbus 15654
1001 ND
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1001 ND
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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