Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed

27 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2005 Last revised: 11 Dec 2022

See all articles by Robert Shimer

Robert Shimer

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Iván Werning

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2005

Abstract

We study the optimal design of unemployment insurance for workers sampling job opportunities over time. We focus on the timing of benefits and the desirability of allowing workers to freely access a riskless asset. When workers have constant absolute risk aversion preferences, a very simple policy is optimal: a constant benefit during unemployment, a constant tax during employment, and free access to savings using the riskless asset. Away from this benchmark, for constant relative risk aversion preferences, the optimal policy involves nearly constant benefits and the welfare gains from more elaborate policies are minuscule. Our results highlight two distinct roles for policy toward the unemployed: ensuring workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption; and providing unemployment subsidies that serve as insurance against the uncertain duration of unemployment spells.

Suggested Citation

Shimer, Robert J. and Werning, Ivan, Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed (October 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11689, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=823191

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Ivan Werning

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