An Evolutionary Explanation for Rotten Kids

Economic Inquiry, Volume XXXVI, Number 1, January 1998

Posted: 20 Jul 1998

See all articles by Bruce G. Linster

Bruce G. Linster

Government of the United States of America - Department of Economics & Geography

Abstract

We explore how natural selection acts upon genes for cooperation, altruism and selfishness in an prisoner's dilemma played by family members. A key parameter determining behavior is that parents and children have different expectations of future offspring. Examining asexual and sexually reproducing populations we show that which strategy of cooperation and defection proves be stable depends on the relative reproduction potential of the players and what proportion of the population is young. "Rotten kids" with altruistic parents can be a stable outcome where reproductive success is the goal, and natural selection may lead individuals to care about their unborn progeny.

JEL Classification: D10, H31

Suggested Citation

Linster, Bruce G., An Evolutionary Explanation for Rotten Kids. Economic Inquiry, Volume XXXVI, Number 1, January 1998, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=82548

Bruce G. Linster (Contact Author)

Government of the United States of America - Department of Economics & Geography ( email )

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