A Computationally Efficient Characterization of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Entry Games

12 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2005

See all articles by Andrew Milman Cohen

Andrew Milman Cohen

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equlibria.

Keywords: Entry games, multiple equilibria, incomplete models

JEL Classification: L11, L13, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Cohen, Andrew Milman, A Computationally Efficient Characterization of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Entry Games (December 2004). FEDS Discussion Paper No. 2005-37 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=825627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.825627

Andrew Milman Cohen (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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