A Computationally Efficient Characterization of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Entry Games
12 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2005
Date Written: December 2004
Abstract
This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from entry games with multiple equlibria.
Keywords: Entry games, multiple equilibria, incomplete models
JEL Classification: L11, L13, G21, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cohen, Andrew Milman, A Computationally Efficient Characterization of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Entry Games (December 2004). FEDS Discussion Paper No. 2005-37
, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=825627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.825627
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