Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

47 Pages Posted: 14 Nov 2005

See all articles by Peter Dürsch

Peter Dürsch

Heidelberg University - Faculty of Economics and Social Studies

Albert Kolb

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

Joerg Oechssler

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Burkhard C. Schipper

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 14, 2006

Abstract

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment.

Keywords: learning, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement, trial & error, strategic teaching, Cournot duopoly, experiments, internet

JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D43, L13

Suggested Citation

Dürsch, Peter and Kolb, Albert and Oechssler, Joerg and Schipper, Burkhard C., Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers (October 14, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=839084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.839084

Peter Dürsch

Heidelberg University - Faculty of Economics and Social Studies ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Albert Kolb

University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics ( email )

Postfach 2220
D-53012 Bonn
Germany

Joerg Oechssler

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany
+49 6221 54 3548 (Phone)
+49 6221 54 3630 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/theorie2/Team/Oechssler/Oechssler_main.html

Burkhard C. Schipper (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
530-752-6142 (Phone)
530-752-9382 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/

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