Bank Runs Without Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
32 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2005
Date Written: December 2001
Abstract
This paper proposes that bank runs are unique equilibrium outcomes instead of self-fulfilling prophecies. By assuming that depositors make their withdrawal decisions sequentially, the model provides an equilibrium-selection mechanism in the economy. A bank run would occur if and only if depositors perceive a low return on bank assets. Furthermore, a panic situation arises only when the market information is imperfect. A two-stage variant of the model shows that banks would deliberately offer a demand-deposit contract that is susceptive to bank runs.
Keywords: bank runs, demand deposit, perfect Bayesian equilibrium
JEL Classification: G21, G14, C7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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