Existence of Approximate Social Welfare
Posted: 14 Feb 2005 Last revised: 29 Dec 2010
Abstract
This paper presents weak requirements on incomplete social preferences, and illustrates how such preferences can be derived from a choice rule. While the requirements do not guarantee the existence of a social welfare function, they do suffice for social preferences to be mapped faithfully to neighborhoods on the real line. That is, whenever consistent social choices are possible between given alternatives, the associated welfare intervals do not overlap.
Keywords: Incomplete Preference Orders, Arrow's Theorem, Social Welfare, Virtual Orders
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Stecher, Jack Douglas, Existence of Approximate Social Welfare. Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 43-56, January 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=870865
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