Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements

25 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2006 Last revised: 4 Dec 2022

See all articles by Edward J. Kane

Edward J. Kane

Boston College - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 2005

Abstract

Although nation-based systems of financial regulation constitute a second-best approach to global welfare maximization, treacherous accountability problems must be acknowledged and resolved before regulatory cooperation can deal fairly and efficiently with cross-border issues. To track and control insolvency risk within and across any set of countries, officials must construct a partnership that allows regulators in every participating country to monitor and to influence counterpart regulators in partnering nations. Using efforts to harmonize the Australian and New Zealand regulatory systems as an example, this paper identifies characteristics by which regulatory systems differ and underscores particular features that make regulatory harmonization difficult to achieve.

Suggested Citation

Kane, Edward J., Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements (December 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11865, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=875717

Edward J. Kane (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )

Fulton Hall
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
520-299-5066 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States