Distinguishing Limited Liability from Moral Hazard in a Model of Entrepreneurship
Posted: 7 Feb 2006
Abstract
We present and estimate a model in which the choice between entrepreneurship and wage work may be influenced by financial market imperfections. The model allows for limited liability, moral hazard, and a combination of both constraints. The paper uses structural techniques to estimate the model and identify the source of financial market imperfections using data from rural and semi-urban households in Thailand. Structural, nonparametric, and reduced-form estimates provide independent evidence that the dominant source of credit market imperfections is moral hazard. We reject the hypothesis that limited liability alone can explain the data.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Paulson, Anna L. and Townsend, Robert M. and Karaivanov, Alexander, Distinguishing Limited Liability from Moral Hazard in a Model of Entrepreneurship. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, pp. 100-144, February 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=881046
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