Getting U.S. Security Holders to the Party: The Sec's Cross-Border Release Five Years on

59 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2006

See all articles by Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven Davidoff Solomon

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brett A. Carron

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

On October 22, 1999, the SEC in the Cross-Border Adopting Release adopted new rules relating to cross-border tender and exchange offers, business combinations, and rights offerings. These rules were enacted as part of an ambitious program by the SEC staff to shepherd the U.S. federal securities laws into the international age by facilitating the inclusion in cross-border takeovers of previously excluded U.S. holders. Five years on, the full impact of the Cross-Border Rules on the international market remains uncertain and rules that were expressly intended to facilitate the inclusion of U.S. security holders in cross-border takeovers have, in many instances, encouraged exclusion. This Article attempts, on the basis of five years of practice and legal development, to pinpoint those areas where the Cross-Border Rules appear to be working; highlight where changes might be beneficial; and suggest possible improvements, reforms, and revisions that would better provide participants with the flexibility that the SEC originally intended.

Keywords: cross-border, takeovers, securities regulation, Williams Act, cross-border release

JEL Classification: K22, G15, G18, G34

Suggested Citation

Davidoff Solomon, Steven and Carron, Brett A., Getting U.S. Security Holders to the Party: The Sec's Cross-Border Release Five Years on. Journal of International Economic Law, Vol, 26, No. 3, pp. 455, Fall 2005, Wayne State University Law School Research Paper No. 07-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=881135

Steven Davidoff Solomon (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Brett A. Carron

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

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