Regulating the Raters: The Law and Economics of Ratings Firms

62 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2006

See all articles by Harold Furchtgott-Roth

Harold Furchtgott-Roth

Furchtgott-Roth Economic Enterprises; Hudson Institute; Brooklyn Law School

Robert W. Hahn

Technology Policy Institute; University of Oxford, Smith School

Anne Layne-Farrar

Charles River Associates; Northwestern University

Date Written: February 2006

Abstract

Consumers and producers frequently rely on product ratings, such as college rankings, restaurant reviews and bond ratings. While much has been written about the structure of ratings in particular industries, little has been written on the general structure of different ratings industries and whether government intervention is typically needed. This paper begins that inquiry by examining the market structure of different ratings industries, and considering the circumstances under which firms that provide ratings should be regulated. The issue is particularly timely in light of recent calls to rethink the regulation of media ratings and credit ratings.

We find that ratings firms in different industries share several common features. For example, most ratings firms operate in highly concentrated markets. Some factors that could make ratings markets more concentrated include economies of scale, benefits from having a single standard, and general agreement on what should be measured. We also find that most ratings firms determine their own testing standards and methods, although some industries have self-governing oversight bodies that offer their own accreditation standards. While the government regulates firm entry for a few ratings industries, this is relatively rare. The vast majority of ratings firms are unregulated.

We analyze the question of regulation using an economic framework that focuses on the viability and effectiveness of a proposed policy. Despite the finding that many ratings industries are concentrated, our analysis suggests that market forces generally appear to be an effective mechanism for providing consumers and producers with useful ratings. In most cases, such markets do not require government intervention. Moreover, in industries characterized by rapid technological change the government is likely to do more harm than good by intervening. As an alternative to government regulation, voluntary industry oversight bodies may be effective in improving communication between the parties and in improving transparency in rating procedures.

Keywords: product ratings, rating industries, market forces

JEL Classification: H00

Suggested Citation

Furchtgott-Roth, Harold and Hahn, Robert W. and Layne-Farrar, Anne, Regulating the Raters: The Law and Economics of Ratings Firms (February 2006). AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 06-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886099 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886099

Harold Furchtgott-Roth

Furchtgott-Roth Economic Enterprises ( email )

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Robert W. Hahn (Contact Author)

Technology Policy Institute ( email )

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University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )

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Anne Layne-Farrar

Charles River Associates ( email )

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Northwestern University ( email )

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