A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups

39 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2006

See all articles by Stefan Brandauer

Stefan Brandauer

University of Munich

Florian Englmaier

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the contest. The delegation can be either to more or less 'radical' group members. The direction of delegation depends on the order of moves and the relative 'aggressiveness' of the group medians. We show that almost certainly very asymmetric equilibria arise, even if the median group members value the rent (almost) equally. Delegation can lead to a social improvement in terms of resources spent in the contest.

Keywords: strategic delegation, contests, rent seeking, political economy, arms races, distributional conflict

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D4, P16

Suggested Citation

Brandauer, Stefan and Englmaier, Florian, A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups (January 2006). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1654, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886491 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886491

Stefan Brandauer

University of Munich ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Florian Englmaier (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28 III/ VG
D-80539 Munich
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
114
Abstract Views
1,066
Rank
435,891
PlumX Metrics