Competition and Private Benefits of Control

43 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2006 Last revised: 18 Jul 2011

See all articles by Maria Guadalupe

Maria Guadalupe

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Francisco Perez-Gonzalez

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Date Written: October 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of competition on private benefits of control (PBC). To test for the effect of competition on private benefits, we use two indexes that measure the level of product and input market anti-competitive regulations. We estimate PBC using the voting premia between shares with differential voting rights. Using a panel dataset of 586 firms in 16 countries, our main findings are three. First, within-country increases in the intensity of competition lead to lower estimates of private benefits of control. Second, competition significantly reduces the dispersion in private benefits. Third, the reduction in the level and dispersion of PBC that result from competition are particularly prominent in weak-rule-of-law countries, in manufacturing industries and in less-profitable firms. Overall, our results suggest that product market competition can help in curbing private benefits of control.

Keywords: Private benefits of control, product market competition, governance

JEL Classification: G30, G15, D40

Suggested Citation

Guadalupe, Maria and Guadalupe, Maria and Perez-Gonzalez, Francisco, Competition and Private Benefits of Control (October 1, 2010). AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=890814 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890814

Maria Guadalupe (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Francisco Perez-Gonzalez

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico

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