Capital Constraints, Asymmetric Information, and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence

45 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2006

See all articles by Dmytro Holod

Dmytro Holod

Stony Brook University

Joe Peek

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Date Written: December 5, 2006

Abstract

A growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate. Most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries. In contrast, we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur. We find that internal capital markets are operative within multibank holding companies and that they are used to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries. Furthermore, we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital, but also the movement of assets (loans) from less capitalized to more capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries. This internal secondary loan market allows banks in holding companies to avoid the "lemons" problem faced by stand-alone banks by making transactions with their affiliate banks. This second mechanism has been overlooked in the existing literature on the operation of internal capital markets within banking organizations. Ignoring this mechanism may seriously understate the volume of activity in the internal capital markets within banking organizations.

Keywords: internal capital markets, financial constraints, banking

JEL Classification: G30, G20, G21

Suggested Citation

Holod, Dmytro and Peek, Joe, Capital Constraints, Asymmetric Information, and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence (December 5, 2006). EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=891563 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.891563

Dmytro Holod (Contact Author)

Stony Brook University ( email )

NY
United States

Joe Peek

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Boston ( email )

600 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, MA 02210
United States

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