Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias

35 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2006

See all articles by Dan Bernhardt

Dan Bernhardt

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Stefan Krasa

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics

Mattias Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 20, 2006

Abstract

Many political commentators diagnose an increasing polarization of the U.S. electorate into two opposing camps. However, in standard spatial voting models, changes in the political preference distribution are irrelevant as long as the position of the median voter does not change. We show that media bias provides a mechanism through which political polarization can affect electoral outcomes.

In our model, media firms' profits depend on their audience rating. Maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by slanting the news. While voters are rational, understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately, important information is lost through bias, potentially resulting in inefficient electoral outcomes. We show that polarization increases the profitability of slanting news, thereby raising the likelihood of electoral mistakes. We also show that, if media are biased, then there are some news realizations such that the electorate appears more polarized to an outside observer, even if citizens' policy preferences do not change.

Keywords: Media bias, polarization, information aggregation, democracy

JEL Classification: C70, D72, D80

Suggested Citation

Bernhardt, Dan and Krasa, Stefan and Polborn, Mattias K., Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias (March 20, 2006). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1798, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=892475 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.892475

Dan Bernhardt

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-244-5708 (Phone)

Stefan Krasa

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics ( email )

410 David Kinley Hall
1407 W. Gregory
Urbana, IL 61801
United States
217-333-7698 (Phone)
217-244-7969 (Fax)

Mattias K. Polborn (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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