Contract Enforcement in the Early Transition of an Unstable Economy

Posted: 11 Apr 2006

See all articles by Kenneth Koford

Kenneth Koford

University of Delaware (Deceased)

Jeffrey B. Miller

University of Delaware; Gallaudet University - Department of Business

Abstract

How were contracts among firms enforced in the early phase of a transition economy when firms lacked experience with commercial contracts or legal procedures? What were their views of their new business environment? We interviewed a sample of Bulgarian firms, including private, state-owned and cooperative firms in 1994. Consistent with Williamson's (1994) theories, complex contracts were quite limited, sometimes implying the breakdown of important markets, but we also found that even spot-market contracts had severe problems of bilateral dependency. Having been burned in previous transactions, firms were very cautious in dealing with new potential trading partners and tried to work closely with trustworthy counterparts. These results are consistent with Klein, Crawford and Alchian's (1978) theory.

Keywords: Bulgaria, Contract enforcement, Contract institutions, Contract law, Legal institutions

JEL Classification: P5, P48, I22, K12

Suggested Citation

Koford, Kenneth and Miller, Jeffrey Bernard, Contract Enforcement in the Early Transition of an Unstable Economy. Economic Systems, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 1-23, March 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=895269

Kenneth Koford

University of Delaware (Deceased)

Jeffrey Bernard Miller (Contact Author)

University of Delaware ( email )

Newark, DE 19716
United States

Gallaudet University - Department of Business ( email )

Washington, DC
United States

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