Searching for Better Prospects: Endogenizing Falling Job Tenure and Private Pension Coverage

FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2003-038E

41 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2006 Last revised: 9 Nov 2008

See all articles by Leora Friedberg

Leora Friedberg

University of Virginia - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Owyang

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Division

Tara M. Sinclair

George Washington University - Department of Economics; George Washington University - Elliott School of International Affairs (ESIA); George Washington University - Institute For International Economic Policy (GWIIEP); George Washington University - Research Program on Forecasting; George Washington University - George Washington Institute of Public Policy (GWIPP); Australian National University (ANU) - Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA); Halle Institute for Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1, 2006

Abstract

Recent declines in job tenure have coincided with a shift away from traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions, which reward long tenure. New evidence also points to an increase in job-to-job movements by workers, and we document gains in relative wages of job-to-job movers over a similar period. We develop a search model in which firms may offer tenure-based contracts like DB pensions to reduce the incidence of costly on-the-job search by workers. Either reduced search costs or an increase in the probability of job matches can, under fairly general conditions, lower the value of deterring search and the use of DB pensions.

Keywords: Pension, Contracts, On-the-job search, Job tenure, Matching models, Job-to-job flows

JEL Classification: E24, J32, J41, J63, J64

Suggested Citation

Friedberg, Leora and Owyang, Michael T. and Sinclair, Tara M., Searching for Better Prospects: Endogenizing Falling Job Tenure and Private Pension Coverage (July 1, 2006). FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2003-038E, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=896546 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.896546

Leora Friedberg

University of Virginia - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 400182
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States
804-924-3225 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Michael T. Owyang (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Division ( email )

411 Locust St
Saint Louis, MO 63011
United States

Tara M. Sinclair

George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )

2115 G Street NW
Monroe Hall Suite 340
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-944-7988 (Phone)
202-994-6147 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://home.gwu.edu/~tsinc/

George Washington University - Elliott School of International Affairs (ESIA) ( email )

2201 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-7988 (Phone)
202-994-6147 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://home.gwu.edu/~tsinc/

George Washington University - Institute For International Economic Policy (GWIIEP) ( email )

1957 E Street, N.W.
Suite 502
Washington, DC 20052
United States

George Washington University - Research Program on Forecasting ( email )

1922 F Street, NW
Old Main, Suite 208
Washington, DC 20052
United States

George Washington University - George Washington Institute of Public Policy (GWIPP) ( email )


United States

Australian National University (ANU) - Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (CAMA) ( email )

ANU College of Business and Economics
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

Halle Institute for Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 11 03 61
Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8
D-06017 Halle, 06108
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.dpe-halle.de/asp/person.asp?xtr&Lang=e

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