The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income

46 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2006

See all articles by Jeffrey L. Kwall

Jeffrey L. Kwall

Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Abstract

Recent commentators have criticized the double taxation of distributed corporate income both as an inequitable tax that imposes greater tax burdens on individual shareholders than other taxpayers and as an inefficient tax that distorts the economic decisions of taxpayers. These scholars have called for integration, the elimination of a corporate tax on distributed income. Yet, integration certainly would mean loss of tax revenues and would require Congress to maintain tax revenues by alternative means. This Article asserts that proponents of integration largely have failed to consider this revenue need constraint. The Article questions the prudence of eliminating the double taxation of distributed corporate income because it may jeopardize recent tax reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and equity of the tax system.

Keywords: integration, double taxation, corporate tax reform

JEL Classification: E62, H21, H22, H25, K34

Suggested Citation

Kwall, Jeffrey L., The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate Income. North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, p. 613, 1990, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=898841

Jeffrey L. Kwall (Contact Author)

Loyola University Chicago School of Law ( email )

Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-915-7152 (Phone)

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