Best-of-Three Contests between Equally-Skilled Players
17 Pages Posted: 9 May 2006
Date Written: April 26, 2006
Abstract
Many contests feature a best-of-N structure. We focus on best-of-three contests between equally-skilled players. Using a general symmetric contest success function, we determine the relationship between the players' efforts in the various rounds. These results imply that the contests are more likely to end in two rounds rather than in three. Data from professional tennis matches strongly support this prediction. Our findings generalize and reinforce the mechanism Klumpp and Polborn (forthcoming) use to explain the New Hampshire effect in US presidential primaries.
Keywords: multiround contest, induced effort, dependent rounds
JEL Classification: C7, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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