Best-of-Three Contests between Equally-Skilled Players

17 Pages Posted: 9 May 2006

See all articles by David A. Malueg

David A. Malueg

University of California Riverside

Andrew Yates

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 26, 2006

Abstract

Many contests feature a best-of-N structure. We focus on best-of-three contests between equally-skilled players. Using a general symmetric contest success function, we determine the relationship between the players' efforts in the various rounds. These results imply that the contests are more likely to end in two rounds rather than in three. Data from professional tennis matches strongly support this prediction. Our findings generalize and reinforce the mechanism Klumpp and Polborn (forthcoming) use to explain the New Hampshire effect in US presidential primaries.

Keywords: multiround contest, induced effort, dependent rounds

JEL Classification: C7, D72

Suggested Citation

Malueg, David A. and Yates, Andrew, Best-of-Three Contests between Equally-Skilled Players (April 26, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=900001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.900001

David A. Malueg (Contact Author)

University of California Riverside ( email )

Economics Department
3136 Sproul Hall
Riverside, CA 92505
United States
951 827 1494 (Phone)

Andrew Yates

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Economics ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States

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