A New Compensation Mechanism for Preference Erosion in the Doha Round

35 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2006

See all articles by Robert Z. Lawrence

Robert Z. Lawrence

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Tatiana Rosito

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

The Doha Round is intended to advance the interests of developing countries but it has run into problems because additional liberalization in sectors of interest to some developing countries could erode the preferences of others. None of the current proposals to deal with the issue, either through delaying liberalization or providing compensation have found widespread support. In this paper we explore a proposal to backload the phase-in of MFN tariff reductions in sensitive sectors and use the revenues generated to provide compensation for preference erosion. We argue that the approach would be both equitable and effective.

Keywords: Economics, International Economics

Suggested Citation

Lawrence, Robert Z. and Rosito, Tatiana, A New Compensation Mechanism for Preference Erosion in the Doha Round (October 2006). John F. Kennedy School of Government Working Paper No. RWP06-044, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=902390 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.902390

Robert Z. Lawrence (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-1118 (Phone)
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Tatiana Rosito

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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