A New Compensation Mechanism for Preference Erosion in the Doha Round
35 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2006
Date Written: October 2006
Abstract
The Doha Round is intended to advance the interests of developing countries but it has run into problems because additional liberalization in sectors of interest to some developing countries could erode the preferences of others. None of the current proposals to deal with the issue, either through delaying liberalization or providing compensation have found widespread support. In this paper we explore a proposal to backload the phase-in of MFN tariff reductions in sensitive sectors and use the revenues generated to provide compensation for preference erosion. We argue that the approach would be both equitable and effective.
Keywords: Economics, International Economics
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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