Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions
Posted: 17 May 2006
Abstract
This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters (2003, J. Eco. Theory) and suggests that indifference of the single agent with respect to principals' offers plays an important role in the failure of the Revelation Principle in Common Agency games. In addition we provide a new proof of Peters' theorems.
Keywords: Genericity, Direct Mechanisms, Revelation Principle, Common Agency
JEL Classification: D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Attar, Andrea and Piaser, Gwenael and Porteiro, Nicolas, Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions. Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=902402
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