Management Earnings Forecast Issuance and Earnings Surprises: An Analysis of Expectations Management

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of firms' public management guidance on their ability to meet or beat analysts' consensus forecasts. The model set forth here accounts for endogeneity of firms' management earnings forecast issuance to examine whether their public management guidance raises their probability of generating favorable earnings surprises. In addition, the model allows for state dependence to investigate whether the firms' past outcomes have any impact on the probabilities of their meeting or beating analysts' consensus forecasts and management forecast issuance. Based on a panel dataset of 1,807 firms and 28,031 firm-quarters between 1994 and 2002, I find the following: Firstly, firms that meet or beat their own management forecast are more likely to meet or beat the analysts' consensus forecast. Secondly, firms with a long history of meeting or beating the analysts' consensus forecasts are more likely to repeat their previous performance. Thirdly, firms with a long history of meeting or beating their own forecasts are more likely to issue management forecasts that they can meet or beat. And lastly, firms with a long history of meeting or beating analysts' consensus forecasts are more likely to issue management forecasts that they can meet or beat. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that not only firms' public management guidance but also their past outcomes play an important role in their ability to generate favorable earnings surprises

Keywords: Earnings Management, Expectations Management, Probit, Dummy endogenous variables

JEL Classification: C13, C15, C33, C35, G30, M41