The Laws of Lawlessness

Posted: 6 Jun 2006 Last revised: 6 Oct 2009

See all articles by Peter T. Leeson

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Abstract

According to conventional wisdom, self-governance cannot facilitate order between the members of different social groups. This is considered doubly true for the members of social groups that are avowed enemies of one another. This paper argues that it can. To investigate my hypothesis, I examine the Anglo-Scottish borderlands in the 16th century. The border people belonged to two separate social groups at constant war with one another. These people pillaged, plundered, and raided one another as a way of life they called "reiving." To regulate this system of inter-group banditry and prevent it from degenerating into chaos, border inhabitants developed a decentralized system of cross-border criminal law called the Leges Marchiarum. These "laws of lawlessness" governed all aspects of cross-border interaction and spawned novel institutions of their enforcement including "days of truce," bonds, "bawling," and "trod." The Leges Marchiarum and its institutions of enforcement created a unique, decentralized legal order that governed inter-group relations between hostiles along the border.

Suggested Citation

Leeson, Peter T., The Laws of Lawlessness. Journal of Legal Studies, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=906621

Peter T. Leeson (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/peter-leeson

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