Social Status and Crime

GATE Working Paper No. W.P.05-10

28 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2006 Last revised: 10 May 2010

See all articles by Emrah Arbak

Emrah Arbak

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS); University of Lyon II - Groupe dAnalyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Date Written: November 1, 2005

Abstract

We consider a large population of agents choosing either to engage in a criminal activity or working. Individuals feel varying degrees of selfreproach if they commit criminal acts. In addition, they are concerned with their social status in society, based on others' perceptions of their values. In making their decisions, individuals weigh both the material and social risks of being a criminal and a worker. We find that introducing social status concerns may induce multiple equilibria. We also consider the implications of intragroup and intergroup interactions in an economy with two classes of earning abilities. Typically, there is more crime in the low ability group and increasing punishment reduces crime, but the opposite may also be true.

Keywords: asymmetric information, behavioral economy, crime, game theory, social identity

JEL Classification: C72, D82, K42, Z13

Suggested Citation

Arbak, Emrah, Social Status and Crime (November 1, 2005). GATE Working Paper No. W.P.05-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=906771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.906771

Emrah Arbak (Contact Author)

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) ( email )

1 Place du Congrès
Brussels, 1000
Belgium

University of Lyon II - Groupe dAnalyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

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