Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Gus Van Harten

Gus Van Harten

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School

Martin Loughlin

London School of Economics - Law School

Abstract

The article outlines a simple thesis: that international investment arbitration - pursuant to regional and bilateral investment treaties - offers the clearest example of global administrative law, strictly construed, yet to have emerged. We present this thesis by explicating four key features of investment treaties: they permit investor claims against the state without exhausting local remedies; they allow claims for damages; they allow investors to directly seek enforcement of awards before domestic courts; and they facilitate forum-shopping. Our argument is that, owing to this unique conjunction of features, the regulatory conduct of states is, to an unusual extent, subject to control through compulsory international adjudication. Having highlighted these features, we then claim that investment arbitration is best analogized to domestic administrative law rather than to international commercial arbitration, especially since investment arbitration engages disputes arising from the exercise of public authority by the state as opposed to private acts of the state. Further, we claim that the linkages between investment arbitration and domestic legal systems are more direct and more closely integrated than other forms of international adjudication in the public sphere. For these reasons, we argue that the emerging regime of investment arbitration is to be understood as constituting an important and powerful manifestation of global administrative law.

Suggested Citation

Van Harten, Gus and Loughlin, Martin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 121-150, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=907655

Gus Van Harten (Contact Author)

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
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416 650 8419 (Phone)

Martin Loughlin

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

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