Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by Michael S. Barr

Michael S. Barr

University of Michigan Law School; University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy; University of Michigan, Center on Finance, Law, and Policy

Geoffrey P. Miller

New York University School of Law

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Abstract

International law-making by sub-national actors and regulatory networks of bureaucrats has come under attack as lacking in accountability and legitimacy. Global administrative law is emerging as an approach to understanding what international organizations and national governments do, or ought to do, to respond to the perceived democracy deficit in international law-making. This article examines the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a club of central bankers who meet to develop international banking capital standards and to develop supervisory guidance. The Basel Committee embodies many of the attributes that critics of international law-making lament. A closer examination, however, reveals a structure of global administrative law inherent in the Basel process that could be a model for international law-making with greater accountability and legitimacy.

Suggested Citation

Barr, Michael S. and Miller, Geoffrey P., Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 15-46, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=907663

Michael S. Barr (Contact Author)

University of Michigan Law School ( email )

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University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )

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University of Michigan, Center on Finance, Law, and Policy ( email )

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Geoffrey P. Miller

New York University School of Law ( email )

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