'Schumpeterian' Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets

Competition, Vol. 14, p. 47, 2005

20 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2006

See all articles by Michael L. Katz

Michael L. Katz

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Haas School of Business

Howard A. Shelanski

Georgetown University Law Center

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss an important movement in contemporary antitrust thinking, the Schumpeterian School. The School's fundamental argument is that antitrust enforcers can better preserve and promote the technological innovation that drives the modern economy by reducing their reliance on short-term indicia of product-market competition. Such arguments are of particular relevance to firms, and the lawyers who counsel them, in such high-tech regions as California's Silicon Valley, Boston's Route 128, and northern Virginia's Dulles corridor. We discuss the specific challenges to conventional antitrust enforcement that Schumpeterian arguments pose, and we examine whether available economic evidence supports the fundamental retreat from antitrust enforcement for which some members of the Schumpeterian School call in the name of promoting innovation.

Keywords: Antitrust, Schumpeter, innovation

JEL Classification: K21, L1

Suggested Citation

Katz, Michael L. and Shelanski, Howard A., 'Schumpeterian' Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets. Competition, Vol. 14, p. 47, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=925707

Michael L. Katz

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

579 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94709
United States

Haas School of Business ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Howard A. Shelanski (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,540
Abstract Views
6,188
Rank
22,427
PlumX Metrics