International Competition, Economics of Federalism, and Competence Allocation Rules

69 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2006

Date Written: August 2006

Abstract

The internationalisation of competition generates the need for an international competition policy regime. However, any realistic attempt must be built upon the existing, predominantly national regimes and, thus, will constitute a multilevel system of antitrust institutions and authorities. Within such a multilevel competition policy system, the horizontal and vertical allocation and delimitation of competition policy competences becomes a crucial problem. This paper uses the economics of federalism to create an analytical framework for analysing stylised competence allocation rules in regard to their performance from en economic perspective. Subsequently, a selection of important stylised competence allocation rules for international competition policy is comparatively analysed. The results of this theoretical analysis allow for policy recommendations in regard to the design of a workable international competition policy regime.

Keywords: competition policy, international economic order, multilevel systems of institutions, competence allocation, economics of federalism, international governance

JEL Classification: F02, L40, F42, K21, H77

Suggested Citation

Budzinski, Oliver, International Competition, Economics of Federalism, and Competence Allocation Rules (August 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=927709 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.927709

Oliver Budzinski (Contact Author)

Ilmenau University of Technology ( email )

Ilmenau, D-98684
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/wth

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