On the Relative Equitability of a Family of Taxation Rules
Posted: 1 Sep 2006
Abstract
A taxation problem consists of collecting a given amount of taxes out of a population whose gross income vector is given. A tax rule R is more equitable than a rule R' when the after-tax income vector generated by R Lorenz dominates that generated by R'. In this paper, we present a one-parameter family of tax rules whose members are fully ranked in terms of relative equitability, for any (finite) income distribution.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. and Villar Notario, Antonio, On the Relative Equitability of a Family of Taxation Rules. Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 283-291, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=927759
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