Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power

61 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2006

See all articles by Elizabeth Lear

Elizabeth Lear

University of Florida Levin College of Law

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Abstract

For many years the federal judiciary has treated forum non conveniens as a housekeeping rule for the federal court system. If indeed this is correct, the federal house is in need of a serious spring cleaning. Circuit splits abound, the standards used and the evidence required for forum non conveniens dismissals vary widely among the district courts, and reverse forum shopping through removal and transfer is commonplace. The problem, however, goes beyond a little clutter. Closer inspection reveals that the very foundation upon which the doctrine rests is unstable. Though built upon the inherent authority of Article III, federal forum non conveniens lies in the area over which Congress may exercise plenary power. Time has changed the congressional landscape: the base upon which the forum non conveniens dismissal structure rests has eroded away, leaving the federal courts in congressionally occupied territory without constitutional support.

Suggested Citation

Lear, Elizabeth, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power. Iowa Law Review, Vol. 91, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=928552

Elizabeth Lear (Contact Author)

University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

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