The Dual Nature of Public Goods and Congestion: The Role of Fiscal Policy Revisited

35 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2006 Last revised: 7 Mar 2011

See all articles by Santanu Chatterjee

Santanu Chatterjee

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics

Sugata Ghosh

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School - Economics Section

Date Written: March 4, 2011

Abstract

The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption-based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax-financed increase in government spending dominates both lumpsum and consumption tax-financing. Replacing the lumpsum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.

Keywords: Public Goods, Congestion, Consumption-based fiscal instruments, Growth, Welfare

JEL Classification: E21, E62, H21, H41, H54

Suggested Citation

Chatterjee, Santanu and Ghosh, Sugata, The Dual Nature of Public Goods and Congestion: The Role of Fiscal Policy Revisited (March 4, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=930440 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.930440

Santanu Chatterjee (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602
United States
706-542-1709 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/schatterjee/home

Sugata Ghosh

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School - Economics Section ( email )

Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
44 1222 875515 (Phone)
44 1222 874419 (Fax)

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