Market Discipline in International Banking Regulation: Keeping the Playing Field Level
Posted: 9 Oct 2006
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Market Discipline in International Banking Regulation: Keeping the Playing Field Level
Abstract
The focus of this article is the debt market as a powerful disciplinarian source for large and complex banking organizations around the world. We empirically study the interactions between reinforcing banks' market discipline and preserving a level playing field in international banking. Our approach consists of conducting cross-country comparisons of the secondary market prices sensitivity to market measures of bank risk (traditional and financial strength ratings). The results are generally consistent with the market discipline paradigm. However, much progress still needs to be made (especially in Japan and certain European countries) in order to make the level playing field principle compatible with the reinforcement of market discipline on an international level.
Keywords: International banking regulation, Basel II, Market discipline, Subordinated debt, Credit spreads
JEL Classification: G15, G21, G28
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