Electoral Participation and Communicative Voting in Europe

44 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2007 Last revised: 5 Nov 2013

See all articles by Francesco Sobbrio

Francesco Sobbrio

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Pietro Navarra

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance; London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS

Date Written: January 2010

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical investigation of electoral participation and communicative voting in 14 European countries. We estimate a multi-level voting process where individuals face a participation decision (whether to vote or abstain) and a voting decision (whether to vote strategically for a likely winner party or as communicating for a sure loser party). Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, individuals who are either independent or uninformed are less likely to turnout. However, being both independent and uninformed does not have any statistically significant effect on electoral participation. Thus, our results question the empirical relevance of the swing voter's curse theory in large elections. Second, the probability of voting as communicating is positively related with the level of education and the degree of dissatisfaction with the political system. Finally, political preferences and institutional features characterizing the functioning of the political system and of the media market have a significant effect both on electoral participation and on the voting decision.

Keywords: Electoral turnout, Swing Voter's Curse, Communicative voting, Strategic voting, Multi-level qualitative choices

JEL Classification: D72, C25

Suggested Citation

Sobbrio, Francesco and Navarra, Pietro, Electoral Participation and Communicative Voting in Europe (January 2010). European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 26 (2), pp. 185-207, 2010., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=948017

Francesco Sobbrio (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Via columbia 2
Rome, Rome 00123
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Pietro Navarra

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti 1
Messina
Sicilia, 98122
Italy
39-090-676-4446 (Phone)
39-090-292-0014 (Fax)

London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS ( email )

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London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
44-207-955-6820 (Phone)

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