Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine
23 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2006 Last revised: 15 Feb 2010
Date Written: August 27, 2008
Abstract
This article examines the doctrine of odious debt in three parts. The first part addresses the purported rule that oppresive debts of a predecessor government do not bind its successor. Part two demonstrates that the purported doctrine of odious-regime debts inadequately supports the human-rights policies that its proponents identify as its normative basis. And the final part of this article proposes that the problem of succession of debts should be reframed more broadly as a problem of succession to all commercial obligations.
Keywords: debt, succession, odious debt, Iraq
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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