A Darwinian Framework for the Economic Analysis of Institutional Change in History

Journal of Social and Biological Structures, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 127-148, 1991

22 Pages Posted: 11 Dec 2006

See all articles by Carsten Herrmann-Pillath

Carsten Herrmann-Pillath

Max Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies

Abstract

Adopting a critical stance towards North's recent theory of institutional change and economic performance, the paper proposes a concept of global efficiency which encompasses not only standard allocative efficiency, but also the efficiency of political institutions in competition among groups. A Darwinian theory of institutions is unfolded in eight propositions which are discussed in some detail. Core concepts include competition among rules and institutions, hierarchical selection, power as proximate goal and criterion of adaptive success, the role of cognitive models, and unintended effects. In particular, the emergence of the state is mostly an unintended effect of the strive for and conflicts over power (in particular, warfare), and in many cases economic institutions emerge as unintended effects of the evolution of the state. Enpirically, a major issue in the Darwinian approach to institutional change is to relate conventional measures of economic efficiency with ecological indicators such as measures of adaptive success proposed by Corning.

Keywords: Northian theory of institutional change, adaptive efficiency, evolution of the state, hierarchical selection, unintended effects, ecology and global efficiency, power structures

JEL Classification: N00, N40, Z00

Suggested Citation

Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten, A Darwinian Framework for the Economic Analysis of Institutional Change in History. Journal of Social and Biological Structures, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 127-148, 1991, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=950695

Carsten Herrmann-Pillath (Contact Author)

Max Weber Center for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies ( email )

Nordhäuserstr. 74
Erfurt, 90228
Germany

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