Recruitment of Seemingly Overeducated Personnel: Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices

45 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2006 Last revised: 12 Jul 2011

See all articles by Oliver Fabel

Oliver Fabel

Chair for International Personnel Management, Institute of Business Administration, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Vienna

Razvan C. Pascalau

SUNY College at Plattsburgh - School of Business and Economics; University of Navarra

Date Written: May 15, 2008

Abstract

Fair employment policies constrain employee selection: specifically, applicants’ professional experience can substitute for formal education. However, reflecting firm-specific job requirements, this substitution rule applies less strictly to applicants from outside the firm. Further, setting low educational job requirements decreases the risk of disparate impact charges. Using data from a large US public employer, we show that successful outsider candidates exhibit higher levels of formal education than insiders. Also, this gap in educational attainments between outsiders and insiders widens with lower advertised degree requirements. More generally, we find strong insider-outsider effects on hiring decisions.

Keywords: fair employment policy, recruitment model, overeducation, insiders vs. outsiders.

JEL Classification: K31, J82, M54

Suggested Citation

Fabel, Oliver and Pascalau, Razvan C., Recruitment of Seemingly Overeducated Personnel: Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices (May 15, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=952708 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.952708

Oliver Fabel (Contact Author)

Chair for International Personnel Management, Institute of Business Administration, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A1090
Austria
+43-1-4277-38161 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ipersonal.univie.ac.at/index.php?id=home1

Razvan C. Pascalau

SUNY College at Plattsburgh - School of Business and Economics ( email )

101 Broad Street
Plattsburgh, NY 12901
United States
518-564-4193 (Phone)

University of Navarra ( email )

Camino del Cerro del Aguila, 3
Pamplona, Navarra 31080
Spain

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