The Vote Motive

77 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2007

See all articles by Gordon Tullock

Gordon Tullock

University of Arizona; George Mason University - Department of Economics

Abstract

In this classic introductory public choice text, Gordon Tullock analyses the motives and activities of politicians, civil servants and voters. Government 'servants' can most likely be assumed to be pursuing their own interests, just like those in the private sector, although, given the coercive power of the state, the effects can be far from benign. The incentive structures present within public institutions mean that government action may well fail to improve economic welfare and frequently has results different from those intended.

The application of the 'economic theory of politics' effectively undermines the market failure approach to government policy-making, which relies on the assumption that benevolent and far-sighted governments are capable of clearing up the failings of private markets.

This new edition includes a reflection by Gordon Tullock and commentaries by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Charles K. Rowley, Stefan Voigt and Michael C. Munger. These contributions consider the impact of the original publication of The Vote Motive in 1976. Thirty-years later, with public-sector bureaucracies retaining substantial control over large swathes of the economy, it is clear that policy-makers still have much to learn from Tullock's seminal work.

Keywords: public choice theory

JEL Classification: B41, H0, H1, H3

Suggested Citation

Tullock, Gordon, The Vote Motive. IEA Hobart Paperbacks No. 33, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=955793 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.955793

Gordon Tullock (Contact Author)

University of Arizona ( email )

McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-2460 (Phone)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

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