Oligarchs, Political Regime Changes, and Firm Valuation
42 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2007 Last revised: 11 Apr 2013
Date Written: February 27, 2009
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of a regime shift on the valuation of politically powerful oligarch firms. Focusing on the Yeltsin-Putin regime shift in Russia, we find that the valuations of oligarch-controlled firms are significantly higher under the Putin regime than under the Yeltsin regime after controlling for industry and time effects. The findings suggest that the increasing cost of extracting private benefits outweigh the reduction in the value of political connections following the political regime change. The results are also consistent with changes in the risk of state expropriation. Our results indicate that effects driven by the political regime change complement the traditional view stating that increased ownership concentration improved the performance of Russian oligarch firms.
Keywords: oligarchs, regime shift, subversion of institutions, political connections, ownership structure, valuation
JEL Classification: G3, G32, P26
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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