Transaction Cost Economics in International Relations: The Case of International Antitrust Enforcement
81 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2007
Date Written: January 30, 2007
Abstract
The paper examines the viability of applying transaction cost reasoning to the government by discussing the possibility of further international cooperation in the field of antitrust. Given that, in their international relations, the analogy between states and private actors is more realistic than in states' domestic behavior, the hypothesis is that the model will do a better job of explaining state behavior than in past efforts.
Keywords: Transaction Costs, Antitrust, International Relations
JEL Classification: A12, B25, D23, D78, H11, H77, H73, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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