Weak Democracy, Strong Information: The Role of Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process

U of Penn Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 07-04

FROM ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT TO INFORMATION GOVERNMENT: GOVERNING IN THE 21ST CENTURY, Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, David Lazer, eds., MIT Press, Forthcoming

36 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2007

See all articles by Cary Coglianese

Cary Coglianese

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Abstract

Techno-optimists advocate the application of information technology to the rulemaking process as a means of advancing strong democracy - that is, direct, broad-based citizen involvement in regulatory policy making. In this paper, I show that such optimism is unfounded given the obstacles to meaningful citizen deliberation posed by the impenetrability of current e-rulemaking developments, the prevailing level of citizen disengagement from politics and policy making more generally, and most citizens' lack of the requisite technical information about and understanding of the issues at stake in regulatory decision making. As such, a more realistic goal for the application of new technology to the regulatory process is to expand the information base available to regulatory decision makers through increased interest group pluralism. Instead of creating conditions of strong democracy, information technology can expand the involvement and access of informed, knowledgeable, and affected parties to the rulemaking process, a weaker form of democracy that nevertheless can provide better information for government officials.

Keywords: Administrative Law, Information Technology, Regulation, Democratic Theory

JEL Classification: K23, K32

Suggested Citation

Coglianese, Cary, Weak Democracy, Strong Information: The Role of Information Technology in the Rulemaking Process. U of Penn Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 07-04, FROM ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT TO INFORMATION GOVERNMENT: GOVERNING IN THE 21ST CENTURY, Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, David Lazer, eds., MIT Press, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=961641

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese

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