The Law and Finance of Venture Capital Financing in Europe: Findings from the RICAFE Research Project

Posted: 19 Feb 2007

See all articles by Marco Da Rin

Marco Da Rin

Tilburg University, Department of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ulrich Hege

Toulouse School of Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Gerard Llobet

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Uwe Walz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Economics; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract

This survey article summarises the findings of four research projects on the venture capital industry in Europe and the role played by legal institutions and the legal framework. A study on patent litigation insurance argues that insurance can create a level playing field for small innovators, but that compulsory insurance can only be justified as a transitory scheme. The second study argues that intermediaries from countries with a better legal tradition will provide more governance and value-added services, even when investing abroad. It also provides supportive empirical evidence based on an extensive questionnaire study. The third project investigates the relationship between venture investments and a widely used legality index in thirty-nine countries, finding that better laws facilitate faster deal screening and origination, lead to a higher probability of syndication and also facilitate board representation of the investors. The final study documents a significant performance gap between the European and the US venture capital industry, but argues that the difference can not be attributed to differences in legal origin.

Suggested Citation

Da Rin, Marco and Hege, Ulrich and Llobet, Gerard and Walz, Uwe, The Law and Finance of Venture Capital Financing in Europe: Findings from the RICAFE Research Project. European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 7, 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=963375

Marco Da Rin (Contact Author)

Tilburg University, Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Ulrich Hege

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France
+33 5 61 12 86 01 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.tse-fr.eu/people/ulrich-hege

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Gerard Llobet

Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) ( email )

Casado del Alisal 5
28014 Madrid
SPAIN
34 91 429 0551 (Phone)
34 91 429 1056 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Uwe Walz

Goethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Economics ( email )

Postfach 81
D-60054 Frankfurt
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

(http://www.safe-frankfurt.de)
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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