Labor Law Enforcement: Dismissal and Incentives

Posted: 27 Feb 2007

See all articles by Yannick Gabuthy

Yannick Gabuthy

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA), University Nancy 2

Eve-Angéline Lambert

University of Lorraine - Universite Nancy 2; University of Angers - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA)

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

The Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) has been at the heart of many analyses with regard to its macroeconomic impact on the labor market outcomes. However, some more recent literature studies the effects of the EPL, specially concerning the individual dismissal, on the behavior of economic agents involved in a labor relationship. These analyses show that the legal rules applying to the breach of such a relationship are not neutral. Indeed, they influence not only the behavior of parties at the time of the breach (e.g. concerning the choice of the type of dismissal or the bargaining over the severance pay) but also during the work relationship (especially in terms of specific investments incentives). In this respect, any legislative policy should take into account this reactive tendency of economic actors in order to make legal rules related to dismissal more efficient.

Keywords: Protection de l'emploi, droit du travail, licenciement, incitations

JEL Classification: A12, K31, K4

Suggested Citation

Gabuthy, Yannick and Lambert, Eve-Angéline, Labor Law Enforcement: Dismissal and Incentives (2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=965405

Yannick Gabuthy (Contact Author)

National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA), University Nancy 2 ( email )

13 place Carnot C.O. n° 26
Nancy, F-54035
France
33 0 3 83 19 26 04 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://cournot2.u-strasbg.fr/users/beta/pagesperso/affinfos.php?id=222

Eve-Angéline Lambert

University of Lorraine - Universite Nancy 2 ( email )

Nancy
France

University of Angers - Bureau of Economic Theory and Application (BETA) ( email )

61, avenue de la Foret Noire
Strasbourg, 67000
France

HOME PAGE: http://cournot2.u-strasbg.fr/users/beta/pagesperso/affinfos.php?id=250

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